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ABSTRACT
How does the opportunity to use tax havens influence economic activity in nearby non-haven
countries? Analysis of affiliate-level data indicates that American multinational firms use tax haven
affiliates to reallocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions and to defer home country
taxes on foreign income. Ownership of tax haven affiliates is associated with reduced tax payments
by nearby non-haven affiliates, the size of the effect being equivalent to a 20.8 percent tax rate
reduction. The evidence also indicates that use of tax havens indirectly stimulates the growth of
operations  in  non-haven  countries  in  the  same  region.  A  one  percent  greater  likelihood  of
establishing a tax haven affiliate is associated with 0.5 to 0.7 percent greater sales and investment
growth by non-haven affiliates, implying a complementary relationship between haven and non-
haven activity. The ability to avoid taxes by using tax haven affiliates therefore appears to facilitate
economic activity in non-haven countries within regions.
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Tax havens are low-tax jurisdictions that provide investors opportunities for tax 
avoidance.  Examples of such tax havens include Ireland and Luxembourg in Europe, Hong 
Kong and Singapore in Asia, and various Caribbean island nations in the Americas.  Low-tax 
jurisdictions are also common within countries, taking the form of special economic zones in 
China, low-tax states and enterprise zones in the United States, and tax-favored subnational 
regions including eastern Germany, southern Italy, eastern Canada, and others.  The scope and 
magnitude of tax haven activity for multinational firms appears to be significant.  In 1999, 59 
percent of U.S. multinational firms with significant foreign operations had affiliates in tax 
havens.   
Economic federations typically struggle with the impact and desirability of tax policy 
diversity among member states.  In particular, there is widespread concern that low-tax areas 
within a federation impose a fiscal externality on other countries and might attract investment 
that would otherwise locate in high-tax areas within the same regions.  There are no reliable 
estimates of the magnitude of such diversion.  Moreover, there has been little consideration of 
the possibility that the availability of low-tax jurisdictions facilitates foreign investment and 
economic activity in high-tax jurisdictions within the same regions.  The latter possibility arises 
if the ability to relocate taxable profits into low-tax jurisdictions improves the desirability of 
investing in high-tax areas, if low-tax jurisdictions facilitate deferral of home-country taxation of 
income earned elsewhere, or if affiliates in low-tax areas offer valuable intermediate goods and 
services to affiliates in high-tax areas.  High-tax countries might then benefit from tax diversity 
within regions, particularly if domestic governments would prefer to offer tax concessions to 
multinational investors but are constrained not to do so by political or other considerations. 
Tax havens figure prominently in current debates over the scope and consequences of tax 
competition.  Countries competing for mobile foreign investment may have incentives to reduce 
taxes to levels below what they would be in the absence of foreign competition; indeed, there are 
circumstances in which international tax competition drives optimizing governments to reduce 
all capital tax rates to zero.  Tax havens are widely believed to accelerate the process of tax 
competition between governments.  Yet, it is conceivable that the tax avoidance opportunities   2
presented by tax havens allow other countries to maintain high capital tax rates without suffering 
dramatic reductions in foreign direct investment.  Hence the proliferation and widespread use of 
tax havens may retard what would otherwise be aggressive competition between other countries 
to reduce taxes in order to attract and maintain investment.  Indeed, despite the incentives in 
place to compete over tax rates, the tax burden on corporate income in OECD countries has 
fallen little if at all over the past 25 years (see Griffith and Klemm (2004)). 
This paper evaluates the effects of tax haven operations on economic activities in foreign 
countries other than tax havens, analyzing the use of tax havens by American multinational 
firms.  The evidence comes from confidential affiliate-level data on the activities of American 
multinational firms from 1982 to 1999, and it points to three conclusions.  First, tax haven 
affiliates serve to facilitate the relocation of taxable income from high-tax jurisdictions and to 
facilitate deferral of repatriation taxes, suggesting that multinational parents with differing 
foreign tax rate exposures can benefit from havens.  Second, affiliates located in larger tax haven 
countries are the most useful for reallocating taxable income from high-tax jurisdictions, and 
their effects are most pronounced within regions.  Ownership of one or more nearby tax haven 
affiliates is associated with reduced tax payments comparable to what would be expected from a 
21 percent local tax rate reduction.  Third, there is no evidence that havens divert activity from 
non-havens within the same region, and, in fact, the opposite appears to be the case.  
Instrumental variables analysis indicates that haven and non-haven activity within a region are 
complementary, as the establishment of tax haven operations is associated with expansions of 
activity outside of tax havens. 
The analysis begins by considering the characteristics of multinational parent companies 
with tax haven operations.  Large multinationals, and those that are most active abroad are the 
most likely to operate in tax havens, suggesting that there are economies of scale in using havens 
to avoid taxes.  Additionally, multinational parents with foreign (non-haven) operations 
concentrated in low tax countries, those in technology-intensive industries, and those in 
industries characterized by extensive intrafirm trade are more likely than others to operate in tax 
havens.  While this evidence is consistent with the intuition that multinationals employ haven 
affiliates to reallocate taxable income from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions through intrafirm 
trade and transfers of intangible property, the fact that multinationals with low foreign tax rates   3
are more likely to operate in tax havens indicates that haven affiliates do not merely serve to 
relocate profits away from high-tax locations.   Instead, this evidence suggests that American 
firms with low foreign tax rates also benefit from using tax havens, presumably to defer, or 
otherwise avoid, U.S. taxation of their foreign incomes. 
Some of this evidence is open to multiple interpretations.  It is possible that aggressive 
tax-sensitive firms are the most likely to establish tax haven affiliates and to concentrate their 
other foreign operations in low-tax jurisdictions, not due to any operational connection between 
these activities, but simply because these taxpayers, when given a choice, always select the 
lowest-tax locations.  More generally, tax havens need not provide the same function for all 
multinational parents.  In order to identify how a multinational’s overall foreign tax rate 
influences its use of tax havens, the analysis distinguishes larger, more populous, tax haven 
countries from smaller tax haven countries, where little employment and capital are located.  
Taxpayers have greater opportunity to transfer taxable profits into larger havens, given the sizes 
of local economies.  The evidence indicates that these larger tax havens serve a distinctive 
function, facilitating the reallocation of income from high-tax to low-tax locations, as parents 
with high average foreign tax rates make greater use of such larger havens, conditional on using 
havens at all.  Ownership of an affiliate in a large tax haven country is associated with reduced 
tax payments elsewhere in the same region, the effect being of the same magnitude as a 21 
percent local tax rate reduction. 
This analysis of the uses of havens – for both income reallocation and deferral of 
repatriation taxes – does not in itself identify the effect of tax haven operations on overall levels 
of economic activity outside of tax havens.  It is conceivable that tax havens facilitate investment 
in non-havens by reducing the cost of capital for such investments, by providing the means to 
reduce tax obligations, and by facilitating the provision of complementary nearby activities.  The 
difficulty confronting empirical analysis of the impact of haven affiliates is that all aspects of a 
firm’s regional activity are simultaneously determined.  Foreign tax rates change infrequently 
and often in rough proportion to each other, making it difficult to use such tax changes to 
identify their impact on economic activity elsewhere in a federation.    4
 Fortunately, it is possible to use differing rates of national economic growth to estimate 
the degree to which haven activity and non-haven economic activity influence each other.  Firms 
investing in economies that subsequently grow rapidly exhibit higher growth rates of foreign 
direct investment than do firms investing in economies that subsequently grow slowly.  
Consequently, GDP growth rates can be used to predict differences between subsequent foreign 
investments of firms whose original investments were located in different countries, and this, in 
turn, can be matched to changes in the use of tax havens.  Evidence from this instrumental 
variables analysis indicates that haven and non-haven activity are complementary, implying that 
policies that encourage the establishment of tax haven affiliates also indirectly encourage 
activities outside of tax havens in the same regions.  Hence, while tax havens permit firms to 
redirect profits and tax revenues away from non-havens within regions, they also appear to 
facilitate economic activity in non-havens. 
Section 2 of the paper reviews the taxation of foreign income and describes the empirical 
methodology used in the subsequent analysis.  Section 3 describes the available data on 
American direct investment abroad and characterizes tax haven activity of American 
multinational firms.  Section 4 presents empirical evidence of the determinants of demand for tax 
haven affiliates and the impact of tax haven operations on economic activity outside of tax 
havens.  Section 5 discusses the implications of the empirical evidence, and section 6 is the 
conclusion. 
2. International  taxation  and  the role of tax havens 
An analysis of the influence of tax havens on non-havens sits at the intersections of two 
large bodies of research.  The first considers the response of multinational firms to tax 
incentives, and the second considers the nature and consequences of tax competition across 
jurisdictions.  This section reviews the research findings of these two literatures and then outlines 
the empirical methodology employed in the paper, with particular emphasis on the instrumental 
variables analysis of the interaction of activity in tax havens and non-havens. 
2.1.    Taxation and multinational firms   5
A substantial body of research considers how taxation influences the activities of 
multinational firms.
1  This literature considers the effects of taxation on investment and on tax 
avoidance activities.  With respect to investment, tax policies are obviously capable of affecting 
the volume and location of FDI since, all other considerations equal, higher tax rates reduce 
after-tax returns, thereby reducing incentives to commit investment funds.  This literature has 
identified the effects of taxes through time-series estimation of the responsiveness of FDI to 
annual variation in after-tax rates of return and cross-sectional studies that exploit the large 
differences in corporate tax rates around the world to identify the effects of taxes on FDI.  
Several of these studies, reviewed in Hines (1997, 1999), report tax elasticities of investment 
equal to –0.6. 
Contractual arrangements between related parties located in countries with different tax 
rates offer numerous possibilities for sophisticated tax avoidance.  It is widely suspected that 
firms select transfer prices used for within-firm transactions with the goal of reducing their total 
tax obligations.  Multinational firms typically can benefit by reducing prices charged by affiliates 
in high-tax countries for items and services provided to affiliates in low-tax countries.  OECD 
governments require firms to use transfer prices that would be paid by unrelated parties, but 
enforcement is difficult, particularly when pricing issues concern differentiated or proprietary 
items such as patent rights.  Given the looseness of the resulting legal restrictions, it is entirely 
possible for firms to adjust transfer prices in a tax-sensitive fashion without violating any laws.  
Multinational firms can structure a variety of transactions – intrafirm debt, royalty payments, 
dividend repatriations, and intrafirm trade – in a manner that is conducive to tax avoidance.  
Studies of the responsiveness of firms to taxes on these margins examine reported profitabilities, 
tax liabilities, and specific measures of financial and merchandise trade in order to identify the 
effects of taxes.
2 
                                                 
1 See Gordon and Hines (2002) for a survey.  For a fuller discussion of the tax rules facing U.S. multinational firms 
and the evidence on behavioral responses to international taxation of U.S. multinationals, see Hines (1997, 1999) 
and Desai, Foley and Hines (2003).     
2 For evidence on intrafirm trade, see Clausing (2001, 2003) and Swenson (2001).  For evidence on intrafirm debt, 
see Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) and Grubert (1998).  For evidence on royalties, see Grubert (1998) and Hines 
(1995).  For evidence on dividend repatriations, see Desai, Foley and Hines (2001) and Hines and Hubbard (1990).  
See Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) for evidence on differences in reported profitability in 
response to tax rates.  While these studies exclusively use data on U.S. multinationals, Bartelsman and Beetsma 
(2003) use country level data within the OECD to identify the prevalence of profit-shifting activities more generally.      6
This study’s emphasis on the role of haven activities is closest in spirit to Harris et al. 
(1993) and Hines and Rice (1994).  Harris et al. (1993) report that the U.S. tax liabilities of 
American firms with tax haven affiliates are significantly lower than those of otherwise-similar 
American firms over the 1984-1988 period, which may be indirect evidence of tax-motivated 
income reallocation by firms with tax haven affiliates.  Hines and Rice (1994) regress the 
profitability of all U.S.-owned affiliates in 59 countries against productive inputs and local tax 
rates and also identify tax havens specifically, dividing havens into the seven large economies 
with populations exceeding one million in 1982, the “Big 7,” and all other tax havens, the so-
called “Dots.”  This classification of tax havens is employed in the analysis that follows. 
In contrast to other studies that rely on country-level or firm-level data, the analysis that 
follows employs detailed affiliate-level panel data in order to investigate several aspects of 
demand for tax haven affiliates on the part of multinational firms.  These include the types of 
parent companies that employ havens, the association between parent company characteristics 
and the types of tax haven countries in which they establish affiliates, links between reported 
profit rates of non-haven affiliates and parent ownership of tax haven affiliates, and any effect of 
haven activity on non-haven activity within a firm.  The detailed data also allow for controls for 
a variety of factors and fixed effects that might otherwise conflate such an analysis.   
While the literature on multinationals and taxation emphasizes the use of havens to 
relocate profits away from high-tax jurisdictions, it is also possible that tax havens can be 
particularly useful to U.S. multinational firms that face repatriation taxes from activities in low-
tax countries.  The United States taxes the worldwide incomes of multinationals, provides partial 
credits to mitigate double taxation, and provides for relief through deferral until these profits are 
repatriated.  As a consequence, profits earned in low-tax countries may generate U.S. tax 
liabilities when repatriated.  Analyses in Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Desai, Foley and 
Hines (2003) illustrate the uses of tax havens to facilitate deferral of repatriation taxes through a 
variety of ownership arrangements.  These arrangements must be carefully structured in order to 
avoid immediate home country taxation of certain passive types of income, but they can 
nonetheless offer benefits to investors with significant potential exposure to home country 
taxation of lightly taxed foreign income.  Consequently, tax havens can benefit multinationals   7
with profits in high-tax locations that can be reallocated to low-tax locations, and can also benefit 
multinationals with profits in low-tax locations on which repatriation taxes can be deferred. 
2.2. Tax  competition 
  The effect of tax haven activity on non-haven activity carries implications for the nature 
and consequences of tax competition.  The literature on tax competition since Oates (1972), as 
reviewed in Wilson (1999), has largely been theoretical, and focused on the possibility that tax 
competition may result in an inefficient underprovision of public goods.  An alternative stream 
of this literature emphasizes the virtues of tax competition in restraining an expansive state, as 
argued in Brennan and Buchanan (1980) and modeled in Edwards and Keen (1996).  Further 
extensions of these models incorporate the political economy of fiscal policy and explore the 
associated consequences for the efficiency of tax competition, as in Gordon and Wilson (2001) 
and Janeba and Schjelderup (2002).  Empirical efforts to consider the salience or consequences 
of tax competition include Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002), who estimate parameters 
of reaction functions within the OECD to measure the extent to which tax competition has 
operated between 1983 and 1999, and Mendoza and Tesar (2002), who simulate the dynamics of 
tax competition within Europe.  Buettner (2003) analyzes fiscal competition within Germany by 
considering the investment effects of tax policies in adjacent jurisdictions. 
  Analysis of tax haven use, and its consequences for non-haven activities, contributes to 
the tax competition literature in two primary ways.  First, such an analysis can clarify the degree 
to which haven activities serve to undermine the fiscal base of non-havens.  For example, it is 
possible to estimate the responsiveness of reported profits to tax rates for parents with and 
without tax haven affiliates.  More importantly, it is commonly assumed in the tax competition 
literature that tax havens, and low-tax locations generally, divert investment from other, more 
highly taxed, locations within a region.  Empirical analysis permits estimation of the effects of 
havens on non-havens, thereby entertaining and testing the possibility that havens encourage 
economic activity in non-havens.
3 
                                                 
3 The suggestion that tax rate heterogeneity within a region need not lead simply to diversion of investment is related 
to the large literature on trade diversion and trade creation pioneered by Viner (1950).  This literature focuses on the 
degree to which preferential trade arrangements are associated with increased trade or simply the diversion of trade 
from non-members, and the associated efficiency consequences.       8
2.3.  Implied symmetry and estimation strategy 
  While the empirical methodology employed in estimating the demand for havens and the 
nature of profit-shifting with havens is relatively straightforward, the analysis of the interaction 
of haven and non-haven activity merits some elaboration.  The impact of tax haven operations on 
activities in locations other than tax havens can be approached in either of two ways.  The most 
obvious method of addressing the issue is to consider the effect of a change in tax haven activity 
on the pattern and extent of activity outside of tax havens.  The problem that this, or any other, 
strategy encounters is that tax haven and non-tax haven activity are jointly determined.  A more 
promising method is to evaluate the effect of non-tax haven activity on operations in tax havens.  
Profit maximization implies that disparate operations have symmetric effects on each other, so 
the impact on tax haven operations of expanding activities in non-tax haven countries is the same 
as the impact on non-tax haven operations of expanding activities in tax haven countries.  Since 
an instrument for changes in affiliate activity outside of havens is more readily available than an 
instrument for activity in tax havens, it turns out to be easier to measure the former effects and 
then make inferences about the latter given the symmetry of the problem.   
  To understand this symmetry, it is helpful to start with reviewing the implications of 
profit maximization.  Firm i’s after-tax profitability can be represented by the function 
() i i i K X ε θ π , , , , in which Xi is a vector of firm-specific characteristics, Ki is a vector representing 
firm i’s investments in each of the n countries, θ  is a vector of characteristics of the n host 
countries, and  i ε  is a firm-specific residual.  The first-order conditions corresponding to optimal 
allocation of capital between each of the n countries are: 
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in which  i λ  is a firm-specific term reflecting the cost of capital.  If firms all have access to the 
same capital sources, then  i λ  should be the same for all firms.  Since θ  is common for all firms, 
it follows that (1a) and (1b) together imply that: 
(2)      ( ) j X f K i i j ij ∀ = , , , ε θ , 
in which  ij K  is the level of firm i’s investment in country j. 
The function (2) can be estimated in a cross-section of firms; doing so amounts to 
running a cross-sectional regression of asset demands on a vector of firm characteristics.  This 
can be made an illuminating exercise by restricting it in various ways.  For example, it is 
possible to construct a dependent variable that takes the value one if a firm has any tax haven 
affiliates, and zero otherwise.  This dependent variable can then be used in a logit regression 
explaining demand for tax haven affiliates as a function of firm characteristics, including firm 
size, primary industry, degree of multinationality, research intensity, and other variables 
plausibly linked to the benefits of establishing and using a tax haven affiliate. 
In order to address the issue of substitutability or complementarity between tax haven and 
non-tax haven operations, it is necessary to consider the implications of changes in foreign 
operations.  Differentiating (1a), it follows that, for small perturbations in the level of investment 
by the affiliate in country h, Kih, 
   ()( )
0




















K X ε θ π ε θ π
, 
or 
(3)     ()
()
ih
ij i i i
ih ij i i i
ij dK
K K X











The effect on investment in country j of a change in investment in country h is the ratio of 
second derivatives of the profit function.  The term in the denominator of the right side of (3) is 
negative, reflecting the diminishing returns to total investment, so the sign of the effect equals   10
the sign of the second cross partial derivative in the numerator.  It is noteworthy that an 
equivalent term appears in the equation describing the effect of a small change in  ij K  on the 
level of  ih K : 
(4)     ()
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ih i i i
ij ih i i i
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From the symmetry of second cross-partial derivatives, the numerator of the first term on the 
right side of (4) equals the numerator of the corresponding term in (3).  Hence the effect of 
changes in  ih K  on  ij K  differs from the effect of  ij K  on  ih K only in the relative magnitudes of the 
curvature terms that appear in the denominators of the first terms of the right sides of (3) and (4).  
Consequently, the complementarity or substitutability of operations in jurisdictions j and h can 
be evaluated either by estimating the effect of operations in j on operations in h, or by estimating 
the effect of operations in h on operations in j. 
A simple approach to estimating the relationship expressed by equation (4) would be to 
regress in the cross section the presence or absence of tax haven operations on a vector of firm 
characteristics, including the magnitude of operations outside of tax havens.  The difficulty 
raised by such an approach is that the resulting estimates will be biased by the presence of any 
omitted variables that are correlated (positively or negatively) with having operations in tax 
haven and non-haven countries.  If there is reason to believe that the impact of such omitted 
variables is small, then it might be appropriate to run such a regression; the problem is that there 
is little reason to expect the impact to be small. 
An alternative approach is to use the panel nature of the data, together with changing 
economic circumstances, to construct instruments for changes in operations outside tax havens. 
From (2), it follows that: 
(5)   () ( ) ( ) i i i j i i j i i i j ij d X f d X f dX X f dK ε ε θ θ ε θ ε θ , , , , , , 3 2 1 + + = , 
in which  jk f  is the derivative of the  j f  function with respect to its kth argument. The second 
term on the right side of (5), () θ ε θ d X f i i j , , 2 , raises the prospect of providing a suitable   11
instrument for estimation purposes.  The  θ d  term captures exogenous changes in the economic 
environments of foreign locations, while the ( ) i i j X f ε θ, , 2  term reflects that these changes need 
not impact all multinational firms to equal degrees.  Hence, if there is reason to expect an 
exogenous change in the economic environment to influence investments by one firm more than 
it does investments by another, then the difference between these investment responses can be 
used to identify the substitutability or complementarity of investment in different locations. 
  The panel nature of the data suggests a powerful instrument that is suitable for this 
purpose.  Economic growth rates differ between countries, and firms differ in their commitments 
to investing in different countries.  Levels of foreign direct investment move together with 
economic growth rates in most countries, reflecting that marginal q, the ratio of the value of new 
investment to its cost, has common elements both for domestic and foreign investors.  Thus, 
economies experiencing declining real costs of production, rising labor productivity, 
deregulatory episodes, or other changes that increase the rate of local economic growth are also 
ones in which foreign investors are likely to expand their operations.  Consequently, American 
firms that invested heavily in economies that subsequently grew quickly tend to exhibit more 
dramatic increases in foreign direct investment than do firms that instead invested heavily in 
economies that subsequently grew slowly.  A natural instrument for the change in firm i’s level 
of foreign direct investment in non-tax haven countries is the growth rate of the countries in 
which it invests, weighted by the levels of its investments.   
3.  Data and descriptive statistics
4 
The empirical work presented in section 4 is based on the most comprehensive available 
data on the activities of American multinational firms.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad from 1982 through 1999 provides a panel of 
data on the financial and operating characteristics of U.S. firms operating abroad.  These surveys 
ask reporters to file detailed financial and operating items for each affiliate and information on 
the value of transactions between U.S. parents and their foreign affiliates. The International 
Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act governs the collection of the data and the Act 
ensures that “use of an individual company’s data for tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes is 
                                                 
4 This description of the data is drawn from Desai, Foley and Hines (2001).   12
prohibited.”  Willful noncompliance with the Act can result in penalties of up to $10,000 or a 
prison term of one year.  As a result of these assurances and penalties, BEA believes that 
coverage is close to complete and levels of accuracy are high. 
U.S. direct investment abroad is defined as the direct or indirect ownership or control by 
a single U.S. legal entity of at least ten percent of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign 
business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise.  A 
U.S. multinational entity is the combination of a single U.S. legal entity that has made the direct 
investment, called the U.S. parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign 
affiliate.  In order to be considered as a legitimate foreign affiliate, the foreign business 
enterprise should be paying foreign income taxes, have a substantial physical presence abroad, 
have separate financial records, and should take title to the goods it sells and receive revenue 
from the sale.  
The foreign affiliate survey forms that U.S. multinational enterprises are required to 
complete vary depending on the year and the size of the affiliate.  The most extensive data for 
the period examined in this study are available for 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999 when BEA 
conducted Benchmark Surveys.  In these years, all affiliates with sales, assets, or net income in 
excess of certain size cutoffs no more than $7 million in absolute value and their parents were 
required to file extensive reports.  In non-benchmark years between 1982 and 1999, exemption 
levels were higher and less information was collected.
5  BEA collects identifiers linking affiliates 
through time, thereby permitting the creation of a panel. 
  Table 1 displays summary statistics for haven and non-haven countries which indicate the 
differences between these kinds of countries.  Tax havens are low-tax foreign countries that offer 
advanced communication facilities, promote themselves as offshore financial centers, and 
frequently feature legislation promoting business or bank secrecy.  Hines and Rice (1994, 
                                                 
5 From 1983-1988, all affiliates with an absolute value of sales, assets, or net income less than $10 million were 
exempt from reporting requirements, and this cutoff increased to $15 million from 1990-1993 and $20 million for 
1995-1998.  BEA uses reported data to estimate universe totals when surveys cover only larger affiliates or when 
only certain affiliates provide information on particular survey forms.  Estimated data is unlikely to have a 
significant impact on the BEA’s published data at the industry or country level as data based on actual reports 
exceeds 90 percent of the estimated totals of assets and sales in each of the years between 1982 and 1999.  To avoid 
working with estimated data, only affiliates required to provide all the information associated with a particular 
analysis are considered.   13
Appendix 1) describe the identification of tax haven countries for the purpose of U.S. businesses 
in 1982, and the current study uses the intersection of this list of tax haven countries and the tax 
haven countries listed in Diamond and Diamond (2002).  Seven of these countries had 
populations exceeding one million in 1982, and they are referred to as the Big 7.
6 
Table 1 indicates that, while more than 12% of affiliates in havens were holding 
companies in 1999, less than 6% of affiliates in non-havens were holding companies.  This fact 
suggests that havens may indeed play an important role in helping multinationals reallocate 
profits and repatriate dividends in ways that avoid taxes, including U.S. repatriation taxes.  Not 
surprisingly, tax rates in havens are much lower than tax rates in non-havens.  The average 
magnitude of these differences persist despite the declining trend in tax rates over the period.  
Finally, the summary statistics also indicate that affiliates in havens sell higher fractions of their 
output to related parties abroad than do affiliates located outside of tax havens.  These sale 
patterns offer opportunities to relocate profits to avoid U.S. or local taxes.  Table 1 includes 
additional information on the extent of multinational activity in the Big 7 tax haven countries and 
in individual havens.  Table 2 presents means and standard deviations of variables used in the 
estimation that follows. 
4.   Tax havens and taxpayer behavior 
The analysis starts by identifying characteristics of multinational parents that are 
associated with the use of havens.  This is followed by distinguishing the uses of tax haven 
affiliates located in large countries from the uses of tax haven affiliates located in small 
countries, and by considering if havens are especially influential within regions. The analysis 
concludes by estimating the degree to which haven activity is a complement to or substitute for 
non-haven activity.  
4.1.  Demand for tax haven affiliates 
  Table 3 presents coefficients from regressions estimating the determinants of demand for 
tax haven affiliates as a function of company attributes.  The dependent variable in the logit 
                                                 
6 Big 7 countries include Hong Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland.  All other 
haven countries are classified as Dots.  
   14
regressions reported in the first three columns is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a 
consolidated parent group includes a tax haven affiliate, and it is zero otherwise.  Some of the 
independent variables are collected only in benchmark years, so the sample includes 
observations for parent groups in 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999.  Column one presents a 
minimalist specification in which only size variables are included as independent variables, the 
variable “log of non-haven sales” corresponding to the log of total foreign sales in countries 
other than tax havens, and the “log of parent sales” is the log of total sales by parent companies.  
Both sales coefficients are positive, indicating that larger firms are more likely than others to 
have tax haven affiliates.  Additionally, the fact that the 0.5918 coefficient on non-haven sales 
exceeds the 0.1575 coefficient on parent sales implies that a higher fraction of foreign operations 
raises the likelihood that a firm has a tax haven affiliate. 
The regressions reported in columns 2 and 3 add squared size terms as well as additional 
independent variables.  Estimated coefficients on the square of the log of non-haven sales are 
positive, whereas estimated coefficients on the square of the log of parent sales are negative, 
implying that greater foreign operations contributes increasingly to the likelihood of having a tax 
haven affiliate, whereas the opposite is true of greater domestic operations.  In order to consider 
the foreign tax characteristics that are associated with haven usage, the independent variable 
“average non-haven tax rate” measures a parent’s weighted average non-haven tax rate, where 
the weights correspond to affiliate sales, and the tax rates by country are measured as the median 
tax rate of affiliates operating in a particular country and year. Higher average tax rates in non-
haven foreign operations reduce the likelihood of establishing tax haven affiliates, as indicated 
by the –2.9084 coefficient in column two.
7  Parent firms in industries for which high fractions of 
total sales go to related parties abroad are more likely than others to have tax haven affiliates, 
though the 0.8545 coefficient in column two is only marginally statistically significant.  Finally, 
                                                 
7 Tax rates are calculated from BEA data by taking the ratio of foreign income taxes paid to foreign pretax income 
for each affiliate, and using the medians of these rates as country-level observations for each country and year.  
Affiliates with negative net income are excluded for the purposes of calculating country tax rates.  For a more 
comprehensive description of the calculation of affiliate tax rates, see Desai, Foley and Hines (2001).  In particular, 
these income tax rates do not include withholding taxes on cross-border interest payments to related parties, since 
such taxes are endogenous to interest payments and in any case immediately creditable against home-country tax 
liabilities.  Desai and Hines (1999) report that adjusting country tax rates for withholding taxes does not affect the 
estimated impact of taxation on affiliate borrowing, due to the combination of creditability and low withholding tax 
rates on related-party interest payments.   15
the estimated 3.1642 coefficient in column two indicates that companies with high R&D/sales 
ratios are more likely than others to have tax haven affiliates.   
While the measure of non-haven tax rates is calculated with median tax rates facing 
affiliates in a country and year, it is useful to consider alternative measures of such tax rates to 
address the concern that this coefficient merely reflects the fact that aggressive firms both 
employ havens and actively locate investment in low tax non-haven locations.  Column three 
repeats the regression in column two, replacing the “Average non-haven tax rate” with an 
average non-haven tax rate for other firms in the same industry.
8  This substitution uses industry 
variation in investment location to avoid some of the problems associated with the simultaneity 
of tax haven and non-tax haven investment decisions.  The results that are very similar to those 
reported in column two. 
Columns 4 through 6 repeat these regressions using Tobit specifications in which the 
dependent variable is the fraction of a firm’s foreign affiliates located in tax havens.  The 
independent variables have effects that are very similar to those reported in columns 1 through 3.  
The –0.6135 coefficient in column 5 implies that ten percent higher average foreign tax rates 
outside of tax havens is associated with a six percent reduction in the fraction of foreign affiliates 
located in tax havens.   The 0.1981 coefficient in the same regression implies that ten percent 
greater industry sales to related parties abroad is associated with two percent higher fractions of 
affiliates located in tax havens, and the 0.4038 coefficient indicates that ten percent greater 
R&D/sales ratios increase the share of affiliates in tax havens by four percent.  The results are 
largely unchanged when the industry non-haven tax rate is used as the tax rate measure in the 
regression reported in column six.  Finally, it is useful to check whether regressions in which the 
dependent variable is based on a measure of activity, rather than counts of affiliates, produce 
similar patterns of coefficients. Columns 7-9 report estimated coefficients from Tobit regressions 
in which the dependent variable is the fraction of foreign sales accounted for by tax haven 
affiliates, with results very similar to those appearing in columns 4-6. 
                                                 
8 Specifically, the tax rate variable in the regressions in columns 3, 6 and 9 of Table 3 is based on the weighted 
average tax rates of other firms in the same industry, in a manner similar to that described in footnote 6.  Rather than 
weight using the distribution of sales of a firm’s affiliates, the weights employed in this alternative tax rate variable 
are based on the distribution of sales of all affiliates of parents in the same industry.  Industries are defined using the 
BEA three-digit ISI codes, which are similar to three-digit SIC codes.     16
The results reported in Table 3 offer useful evidence of characteristics that stimulate 
demand for tax haven affiliates.  Firms with extensive foreign operations are the most likely to 
establish tax haven affiliates, which is sensible under almost any interpretation of their function.  
Firms whose non-haven affiliates are disproportionately located in low-tax countries are more 
likely than others to have tax haven affiliates, suggesting that the use of tax havens to facilitate 
deferral of home-country taxation is a more powerful inducement to establish tax haven 
operations than is the potential transfer pricing use of tax havens.  Parent companies in industries 
with greater intensities of sales to related parties abroad are more likely to have tax haven 
affiliates, which is consistent both with efforts to relocate taxable income from home countries to 
tax havens and with the use of tax haven affiliates to defer home country taxation of income 
reported to have been earned by other foreign affiliates.  R&D-intensive firms are the most likely 
to have tax haven affiliates, which may reflect the benefits and relative ease of relocating income 
produced by intangible technology assets or intangible property itself. 
In order to examine further how a multinational’s overall foreign tax rate influences its 
use of tax havens, the analysis distinguishes larger, more populous, tax haven countries from 
smaller tax haven countries, where little employment and capital are located.  Firms are likely to 
be more able to relocate profits to larger tax haven countries since they have more substantial 
operations in these environments and therefore are less likely to attract the suspicions of tax 
authorities.  The regressions reported in table 4 are run using observations only from parent 
companies with tax haven affiliates; the dependent variables in these regressions are the shares of 
tax haven activities located in the Big 7 countries.  Columns 1-3 of Table 4 report estimated 
coefficients from Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the fraction of tax haven 
affiliates located in the Big 7 countries.  The sample consists of observations of parent 
companies with haven affiliates and covers the benchmark survey years of 1982, 1989, 1994 and 
1999.  Column 1 reports a 0.1065 estimated coefficient on the log of non-haven sales, and a –
0.2546 coefficient on the log of parent sales, which together imply that larger parent firms, and 
those whose foreign affiliates contribute smaller fractions of total sales, concentrate less of their 
tax haven activity in Big 7 countries. 
The regressions reported in columns two and three add the same explanatory variables as 
those used in the regressions presented in Table 3.  The 2.2367 coefficient in column two   17
indicates that ten percent higher foreign tax rates are associated with 22 percent higher desired 
fractions of tax haven affiliates located in Big 7 countries.  The 1.0699 coefficient in the same 
regression implies that ten percent greater industry sales to related parties abroad is associated 
with ten percent higher fractions of tax haven affiliates located in Big 7 countries, and the 1.3739 
coefficient indicates that ten percent greater R&D/sales ratios have somewhat larger effects.  
Very similar results appear in column three, in which industry tax rates are used in place of firm 
tax rates, and in columns 4-6, in which the dependent variable is the fraction of tax haven sales 
accounted for by affiliates in Big 7 countries. 
The results presented in Table 4 afford a more nuanced interpretation of the tax haven 
demand specifications presented in Table 3.  High foreign tax rates among affiliates outside of 
tax havens are associated with significantly greater tax haven concentration in Big 7 countries, 
which is consistent with the use of these larger tax haven countries to relocate taxable incomes 
through transfer pricing.  Sales to related parties abroad and high R&D/sales ratios may present 
opportunities to use transfer prices to relocate taxable income, so the positive association of these 
variables with the fraction of tax haven activity in Big 7 countries is again suggestive of transfer 
pricing motives at work.   
4.2.  Tax havens and tax payments 
  Table 5 presents regressions that further explore the use of tax haven affiliates to relocate 
taxable income with particular attention to the role of regional tax havens.  The dependent 
variable in the regressions reported in Table 5 is the ratio of tax payments to sales for affiliates 
located outside of tax haven countries.  The regressions in Table 5 investigate if this ratio is 
distinctive for affiliates of firms that make use of tax havens.  If certain firms can relocate 
income to low or zero tax locations, then this ability will reduce observed returns and observed 
tax payments in high tax locations.
9  
The regressions reported in Table 5 include measures of affiliate leverage, defined as the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets, since the tax deductibility of interest payments is likely to 
                                                 
9 There is no single dependent variable that is ideal from the standpoint of measuring tax-motivated income 
reallocation, though the use of alternative dependent variables, such as the ratio of after-tax income to equity, or the 
ratio of tax payments to equity, produces results very similar to those reported in Table 5.   18
induce a negative correlation between tax payments and greater leverage in a mechanistic way.  
The regressions also include dummy variables for parent companies, affiliate industries, and 
years, and the standard errors are clustered at the affiliate level.  Country tax rates are positively 
associated with tax payments, as was expected, though parent ownership of any tax haven 
affiliate has only small and insignificant negative effects on tax payments in the regressions 
reported in columns one and two.  Ownership of regional tax haven affiliates, however, is 
associated with significantly reduced tax payments.  The –0.0207 coefficient in column three 
indicates that affiliates whose parent companies have tax haven affiliates in the same region pay 
2.1 percent lower taxes as a fraction of sales.  This, together with the 0.0996 estimated tax rate 
coefficient, implies that ownership of a regional tax haven affiliate has the same effect on tax 
payments as would a 20.8 percent lower tax rate. 
The regression reported in column four of Table 5 distinguishes the effects of tax haven 
affiliates in large and small countries by adding a dummy variable for firms with regional tax 
havens located in Dots but not Big 7 countries.  The positive and significant 0.0073 coefficient 
on this dummy variable indicates that ownership of regional affiliates in Dots but not Big 7 
countries is associated with a smaller tax reduction than is broader ownership of tax haven 
affiliates.
10  This pattern is consistent with the evidence in Table 4 pointing to the income 
reallocation role of tax haven affiliates located in larger countries.  The regressions reported in 
columns 5 and 6 repeat the regressions reported in 3 and 4, using a sample including affiliates 
whose parents own at least one tax haven affiliate somewhere; these regressions are identified 
because not all parents with tax haven affiliates have them in every region.  The results are very 
similar to those reported in columns 3 and 4, suggesting that the patterns are not simple artifacts 
of comparing the characteristics of firms with and without tax haven affiliates. 
  The evidence presented in Table 5 points to the use of tax haven affiliates to facilitate 
reallocating taxable income from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions, with a particularly 
pronounced effect within regions.  This evidence is consistent with the tax haven demand 
regressions presented in Tables 3 and 4.  The ability to reallocate taxable income and to defer 
                                                 
10 It is nonetheless the case that ownership of haven affiliates located in Dots is associated with reduced tax changes, 
the sum of the –0.0225 and 0.0073 coefficients in column four equaling –0.0152, which differs significantly from 
zero.  The use of Dots to facilitate deferral of home country taxes is consistent with such a pattern, since deferral 
increases a firm’s incentive to use other means to reallocate taxable income away from high-tax jurisdictions.   19
home country tax liabilities should increase the desirability of investing in countries other than 
tax havens, though it is possible that the attractiveness of tax haven locations diverts investment 
that might otherwise have located elsewhere.  Hence the net effect of tax haven opportunities on 
business activity in non-haven countries is difficult to predict based on competing 
considerations, and must instead be judged on the basis of empirical evidence. 
4.3.  Tax havens and non-haven activity 
  As discussed in section 2.3, the empirical strategy to identify the relationship between 
haven and non-haven activity is to use GDP growth rates as instruments for non-haven growth 
rates.  This instrumental variables strategy takes a firm’s initial distribution of activity among 
non-haven countries to be exogenous from the standpoint of subsequent changes in tax haven 
affiliate ownership.  Foreign economies grow at different rates, and with them grow levels of 
economic activity by U.S.-owned affiliates.  The first stage of the regressions uses the fact that 
firms differ in their initial distributions of foreign economic activity to predict different growth 
rates of subsequent activity, based on differences in the average GDP growth rates of the 
countries in which their activities were initially concentrated.  These predicted growth rates then 
become the independent variables in second stage equations predicting the acquisition or 
elimination of tax haven affiliates.   
Table 6 presents the results of the first stage regressions employed to generate predicted 
values then used in the regressions in Table 7.  Observations represent changes between 
benchmark years in regional characteristics of foreign operations distinguished by American 
parent company.  The dependent variable in the regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 
6 is the annual growth rate (between benchmark surveys) of aggregate regional sales in countries 
other than tax havens.  The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the annual growth rate of 
regional net property, plant, and equipment (Net PPE) held by affiliates outside tax havens.  The 
critical independent variable in these regressions is the weighted average of foreign GDP growth 
rates, in which the weights are fractions of non-haven foreign Net PPE in base periods.  As the 
regressions indicate, weighted GDP growth rates correlate positively with growth of sales and   20
growth of capital stocks in the same regions, suggesting that they serve as reasonable instruments 
for changes in activity outside of tax havens.
11 
  Columns 1 through 10 of Table 7 present estimated coefficients from second stage fixed 
effect logit equations in which predicted values of changes in sales and capital stocks of non-
haven affiliates are used as independent variables.
12  Observations again represent changes 
between benchmark years in the regionally aggregated activities of parent companies.  The 
dependent variable takes the value one if a firm has no tax haven affiliates in the region in the 
base period but has one or more tax haven affiliates in the region by the time of the following 
benchmark survey.  The dependent variable is zero if a firm has one or more tax haven affiliates 
but loses them by the following benchmark survey.  Observations of firms that never have tax 
haven affiliates, and those that always have tax haven affiliates, are excluded from the sample.  
This seemingly odd procedure, developed by Chamberlain (1980), corresponds to a logit model 
with unchanging firm fixed effects and permits straightforward estimation of the determinants of 
tax haven demand. 
The results indicate that greater activity outside of tax havens is associated with greater 
demand for tax haven affiliates.  The estimated 6.5934 coefficient on affiliate sales growth in 
column 1, and corresponding 8.4789 coefficient in column 2, indicate that higher sales growth 
rates outside of tax havens significantly influence the use of tax haven affiliates.  This result is 
not simply driven by goods produced by non-haven affiliates and then sold in regional havens.  
In columns three and four, non-haven Net PPE growth is used in place of non-haven sales 
growth, and the results also indicate a complementary relationship between non-haven and haven 
activity.   
The results indicate that firms whose initial investments were concentrated in economies 
that subsequently grew rapidly are the most likely to begin use of tax haven affiliates.  These 
results hold when using sales growth as well as Net PPE growth.  As a consequence of the 
                                                 
11 Numerous studies of firm growth, including Evans (1987) and Hall (1987), indicate that small firms grow faster 
than large ones.  Therefore, specifications 1 and 3 control for measures of initial firm size.  To ensure that the 
instrumental variables results that follow identified solely off of differences in initial size, the analysis also uses 
predicted values from specifications 2 and 4 that do not include proxies for initial size. 
12 Murphy and Topel (1985) discuss the problems associated with obtaining a valid estimate of variance in a two-
stage maximum likelihood estimation setting such as this.  The standard errors presented in Table 7 are based on 
Murphy-Topel estimates of variance.     21
symmetry established in section 2.3, this complementary relationship in turn indicates that the 
acquisition of tax haven affiliates encourages greater economic activity among foreign affiliates 
outside of tax havens.  The regressions reported in columns 1 through 4 imply that, when 
evaluated at sample means, a one percent greater likelihood of establishing a tax haven affiliate 
is associated with 0.5 to 0.7 percent greater sales and investment growth outside of tax havens 
within the same region. 
Columns 5 through 10 of Table 7 repeat with regional subsamples the specifications run 
on the whole sample and reported in columns 1 and 3.  While the results within the Asia/Pacific 
are not statistically significant (columns 5 and 6), the European (columns 7 and 8), and American 
(columns 9 and 10) subsamples both exhibit coefficient magnitudes, signs, and significance 
levels that are similar to those of the whole sample.  Given the much greater economic 
significance of Europe and the Americas for U.S. multinationals during the sample period, it is 
reassuring that their patterns so closely resemble those of the sample as a whole. 
5. Implications 
  The ability of foreign investors to use tax havens carries implications for the policies of 
high-tax countries and for the dynamics of tax competition.  Careful use of tax haven affiliates 
permits foreign investors to avoid some of the tax burdens imposed by countries with high tax 
rates, thereby maintaining foreign investment at levels exceeding those that would persist if tax 
havens were unavailable.  This consideration suggests that high-tax countries might benefit from 
the existence of regional tax havens, though such an intuition immediately begs the question of 
whether high-tax countries would not do better simply to reduce their own tax rates on inbound 
foreign investment.  Indeed, the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) analysis of optimal taxation, as 
interpreted by Gordon (1986) and reviewed in Gordon and Hines (2002), implies that countries 
facing elastic supplies of foreign investment should reduce tax rates on foreign investors below 
the rates that are imposed on less tax-elastic domestic investors.  It can be challenging, however, 
to implement such a program.  Domestic political considerations make it difficult to offer 
foreign-owned businesses more favorable tax treatment than domestic businesses, and domestic 
firms facing such a tax regime would have incentives to restructure themselves as foreign firms.  
Governments of high-tax countries might prefer to permit tax avoidance by the use of affiliates   22
in foreign tax havens, in spite of the associated lost tax revenue and efficiency costs, if the ability 
to use tax havens is a realistic signal of the truly multinational, and therefore elastic, nature of an 
investment. 
  The available macroeconomic evidence indicates that countries have not reduced their 
taxation of foreign investment, or of capital income, to anything approximating the degree 
implied by many models of capital tax competition.  The use of tax havens by foreign investors 
may help to explain this empirical pattern, as high-tax countries are able to maintain high tax 
rates while continuing to draw significant levels of foreign investment.  It is not even necessary 
that high-tax countries are aware of the importance of tax havens in preserving their ability to 
attract foreign investment.  One further implication of this analysis is that tax harmonization 
within federations may actually foster, rather than restrict, tax competition.  Initiatives to impose 
tax harmonization would eliminate regional tax havens, thereby reducing foreign investment in 
the region.  Downward pressure on national tax rates might well follow in an effort to attract 
investment, a process that could have been made less likely with the diversity afforded by 
allowing havens within a region. 
6.  Conclusion 
The evidence indicates that American multinational firms establish affiliates in tax haven 
countries as part of their international tax avoidance strategies.  Tax haven affiliates appear both 
to facilitate the relocation of taxable income from high tax locations and to allow firms to defer 
repatriation taxes on income earned in low tax locations.  Affiliates in larger tax haven countries 
appear to be particularly well suited for reallocating income, presumably reflecting the effects of 
government enforcement of transfer pricing rules.  Contrary to many policy concerns and the 
assumptions of much of the tax competition literature, haven activity does not appear to divert 
activity from non-havens, as the estimates imply that firms establishing tax haven operations 
expand, rather than contract, their foreign activities in nearby countries other than tax havens. 
From the standpoint of host country governments, the ability of foreign investors to use 
tax havens in the same region has the beneficial effect of stimulating investment, even as it may 
erode tax revenue collection from any additional investment.  For governments that, on 
efficiency grounds or other grounds, would prefer to reduce tax rates on inbound foreign   23
investment but are constrained from doing so by political or other considerations, encouraging 
the widespread use of regional tax havens offers a convenient alternative. The fear that the 
existence and use of regional tax havens might encourage firms to substitute economic activity 
away from nearby high tax locations receives no empirical support in the behavior of American 
multinational firms.      24
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All Havens 2,759 2,650 2,599 3,053 276 219 194 369 20.2% 12.4% 12.3% 10.3% 28.6% 30.2% 36.6% 37.5%
All Non-Havens  15,819 16,018 18,299 19,867 446 586 689 1,156 42.5% 35.5% 31.4% 30.6% 16.0% 17.8% 19.8% 18.5%
Big 7 Havens 1,592 1,722 1,877 2,042 165 111 105 148 21.3% 15.6% 14.5% 13.2% 20.4% 30.0% 35.2% 36.8%
Hong Kong 323 452 525 555
Singapore 240 333 436 484
Switzerland 532 521 504 467
Ireland 216 250 282 403
UK Islands, Caribbean 157 159 118 330
Bermuda 356 302 299 316
Panama 198 135 111 98
Luxembourg 63 53 50 91
Bahamas 180 129 48 81
Barbados 15 33 45 67
Netherlands Antilles 315 179 91 40
Liberia 58 26 13 27
Notes: Summary statistics are provided for the years when benchmark surveys were performed: 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999.  “Number of Reporting Affiliates” is the total number of affiliates that 
operate in a particular country and year and file survey forms with BEA. Reporting exemption levels vary through time.  All affiliates with an absolute value of sales, assets, or net income in excess of 
$1 million in 1982, $3 million in 1989, $3 million in 1994, and $7 million in 1999 are required to report.  "Number of Holding Companies" is the number of those affiliates that are classified as 
enterprises engaged primarily in holding or owning securities for the purposes of exercising control.  "Country Tax Rate" is defined as the median tax rate faced by affiliates within a country in a given 
year; these medians are averaged to obtain measures for the groupings of countries.  "Share of Sales to Related Parties Abroad" is the ratio of sales to related parties abroad to total sales, aggregated 
within those country groupings.  "Haven" countries and "Big 7 Havens" are those identified as such in Hines and Rice (1994); the "Big 7 Havens" are Hong Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Panama, 
Singapore, and Switzerland.
Share of Affiliate Sales to 
Related Parties Abroad
Table 1
Summary of Haven Activity
Information for Selected Havens
Number of Reporting Affiliates
Number of Holding 
Companies
Country Tax RateMean Median Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
Have Haven Dummy 0.3778 0.0000 0.4849
Share of Affiliates in Havens 0.0789 0.0000 0.1476
Share of Affiliate Sales in Havens 0.0618 0.0000 0.1576
Share of Haven Affiliates in the Big 7 0.6441 0.8750 0.4171
Share of Haven Affiliate Sales in the Big 7 0.6952 1.0000 0.4276
Ratio of Foreign Taxes to Sales 0.0364 0.0122 0.0861
Affiliate Sales Growth in Non-Havens 0.0715 0.0662 0.2754
Affiliate Net PPE Growth in Non-Havens 0.0694 0.0596 0.2717
Haven Use Dummy 0.6011 1.0000 0.4899
Independent Variables
Log of Non-Haven Sales 10.8954 10.6801 2.1573
Log of Parent Sales 12.5827 12.5594 2.0114
Average Non-Haven Tax Rate 0.3631 0.3687 0.0752
Industry Average Non-Haven Tax Rate 0.3641 0.3528 0.0520
Industry Share of Sales to Related Parties Abroad 0.1249 0.1103 0.0835
Parent Industry R&D to Sales Ratio 0.0260 0.0046 0.0581
Own Affiliate in Haven 0.8847 1.0000 0.3194
Parent Owns Haven Affiliates Only in Dot Havens 0.0406 0.0000 0.1973
Own Affiliate in Haven in Region 0.7485 1.0000 0.4339
Parent Owns Regional Haven Affiliates Only in Dot Havens 0.1190 0.0000 0.3238
Country Tax Rate 0.3568 0.3512 0.0964
Leverage 0.6326 0.5945 0.2306
Leverage Interacted with Country Tax Rate 0.2274 0.2013 0.1049
Beginning of Period Sales in Non-Havens 10.7907 10.6322 2.0359
Beginning of Period Net PPE in Non-Havens 8.7989 8.7265 2.4831
GDP Growth Rate 0.0421 0.0414 0.0189
Table 2
worldwide sales for a parent.  "Average Non-Haven Tax Rate" is the weighted average country tax rates for a parent in non-havens where country tax rates are the 
median tax rate for affiliates in that country and year and the weights araffiliate sales.  "Industry Average Non-Haven Tax Rate" is the average non-haven tax rate 
faced by a firm's competitors where rates are aggregated across competitors using weights of non-haven sales.  "Industry Share of Sales to Related Parties Abroad"
is the weighted average industry ratio of sales to related parties abroad to total sales where industry ratios are determined with data aggregated at the three-digit 
level for all affiliates in that industry worldwide and weights are affiliate sales. "Parent R&D to Sales Ratio" is the ratio of parent R&D to sales.  "Own Affiliate in 
Haven" is a dummy variable set equal to one if the parent of the affiliate owns an affiliate in a haven anywhere in the world in that year and is set equal to zero 
otherwise.  "Parent Owns Haven Affiliates Only in Dots" is a dummy variable set equal to one in a particular year if the affiliate's parent owns at least one affiliate 
in a dot haven but no affiliates in big seven havens; it is set equal to zero otherwise.  "Own Affiliate in Haven in Region" is a dummy variable set equal to one 
if the parent of the affiliate owns an affiliate in a haven in the same region as the affiliate in that year and is set equal to zero otherwise.   "Parent Owns Regional 
Haven Affiliates Only in Dots" is a dummy variable set equal to one in a particular year if the affiliate's parent owns at least one affiliate in a dot haven within the 
affiliate's region but no affiliates in Big7 havens in that region; it is set equal to zero otherwise.  "Country Tax Rate" is the median tax rate faced by affiliates 
within a country in a given year.  "Leverage" is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets for the affiliate in that year.  "Leverage Interacted with Country Tax Rate"
is the product of "Leverage" and "Country Tax Rate.  "Beginning of Period Sales in Non-Havens" is the value of sales in the first year of the period for parents in 
non-havens in the region.  "Beginning of Period Net PPE in Non-Havens" is the value of Net PPE in the first year of the period for parents in non-havens in the 
region.  "GDP Growth Rate" is the weighted average growth rate of the non-haven economies where the weights are the share of parent Net PPE in a country 
within that region.
Notes: "Have Haven Dummy" is a dummy variable set equal to one if a parent owns an affiliate in a haven.  "Share of Affiliates in Havens" is the ratio of 
affiliates in havens to all affiliates, by parent, and "Share of Affiliate Sales in Havens" is the ratio of affiliate sales in havens to sales from all affiliates, by parent.  
"Share of Haven Affiliates in the Big 7" is the ratio of affiliates in Big 7 Havens to affiliates in all havens, by parent, and "Share of Haven Affiliate Sales in the 
Big 7" is the ratio of affiliate sales in Big 7 Havens to sales from affiliates in all havens, by parent.  "Ratio of Foreign Taxes to Sales" is the ratio of foreign taxes 
to sales for affiliates in non-havens by year.  "Affiliate Sales Growth in Non-Havens" and "Affiliate Net PPE Growth in Non-Havens" are annual growth rates for 
multinational parents in non-havens, by regions, for the periods between benchmark survey years.  "Haven Use Dummy" is a dummy variable set equal to one if 
the parent begins using havens during a period (1982-1989, 1989-1994, 1994-1999) within a region and set equal to zero if the parent stops using a haven during 
a period within a region.  "Log of Non-Haven Sales" is the log value of sales by affiliates in non-havens for a parent.  "Log of Parent Sales" is the log value of
Descriptive StatisticsDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant -9.0327 -5.9885 -5.7235 -1.0884 -1.2838 -1.2623 -1.1289 -1.4433 -1.3607
(0.3063) (1.8713) (1.8985) (0.0411) (0.2582) (0.2686) (0.0486) (0.2808) (0.2899)
0.5918 -0.5778 -0.5959 0.0421 -0.0132 -0.0160 0.0355 -0.0348 -0.0363
(0.0323) (0.0836) (0.0848) (0.0042) (0.0177) (0.0185) (0.0048) (0.0209) (0.0213)
0.0537 0.0543 0.0025 0.0026 0.0032 0.0033
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
0.1575 0.7895 0.7408 0.0395 0.1494 0.1446 0.0434 0.1844 0.1804
(0.0291) (0.2923) (0.2896) (0.0049) (0.0407) (0.0408) (0.0058) (0.0431) (0.0427)
-0.0255 -0.0236 -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0056 -0.0054
(0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016)
-2.9084 -2.4676 -0.6135 -0.5453 -0.5813 -0.7072
(0.5904) (1.2546) (0.1108) (0.2108) (0.1231) (0.2309)
0.8545 1.0141 0.1981 0.2303 0.2348 0.2690
(0.4620) (0.4662) (0.0760) (0.0775) (0.0865) (0.0881)
3.1642 3.0290 0.4038 0.3758 0.5458 0.5249
(0.6441) (0.6247) (0.0841) (0.0828) (0.0999) (0.0984)
Year Fixed Effects? YYY YYY YYY
NNY NNY NNY
No. of Obs. 8,435 7,738 7,720 8,435 7,738 7,720 8,435 7,738 7,720
Log Likelihood -4,062 -3,599 -3,608 -3,255 -2,853 -2,874 -3,298 -2,902 -2,912
Table 3
Determinants of the Demand for Havens
Square of Log of Non-
Haven Sales
Square of Log of Parent 
Sales
Log of Parent Sales
Log of Non-Haven Sales
for all affiliates in that industry worldwide and weights are affiliate sales. "Parent R&D to Sales Ratio" is the ratio of parent R&D to sales.  Specifications 3, 6, and 9 use the "Average Non-Haven Tax 
Rate" faced by a firm's competitors as a measure of this variable for a particular firm.  All specifications include year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the parent level.  
Have Haven Dummy
Industry Share of Sales to 
Related Parties Abroad
Parent R&D to Sales Ratio
Share of Affiliates in Havens Share of Affiliate Sales in Havens
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 through 3 is a dummy variable set equal to one if a parent owns an affiliate in a haven.  The dependent variable in columns 4 through 6 is the ratio of 
affiliates in havens to all affiliates, by parent.  The dependent variable in columns 7 through 9 is the ratio of affiliate sales in havens to sales from all affiliates, by parent.  All of the specifications use 
parent level data drawn from 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999.  The specifications in columns 1 through 3 are logit specifications, and the specifications in columns 4 through 9 are Tobit specifications.  "Log 
of Non-Haven Sales" is the log value of sales by affiliates in non-havens for a parent.  "Log of Parent Sales" is the log value of worldwide sales for a  parent.  "Average Non-Haven Tax Rate" is the 
weighted average country tax rates for a parent in non-havens where country tax rates are the median tax rate for affiliates in that country and year and weights are affiliate sales.  "Industry Share of Sales 
to Related Parties Abroad" is the weighted average industry ratio of sales to related parties abroad to total sales where industry ratios are determined with data aggregated at the three-digit SIC level  
Average Non-Haven Tax 
Rate
Use Industry Non-Haven 
Tax Rate?Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 3.2394 -0.5259 -1.3480 3.3275 0.2418 -1.0809
(0.2487) (1.3872) (1.4217) (0.2729) (1.4767) (1.5138)
0.1065 0.2711 0.2666 0.1352 0.2392 0.2285
(0.0199) (0.0716) (0.0672) (0.0234) (0.0873) (0.0844)
-0.0079 -0.0076 -0.0054 -0.0049
(0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0035)
-0.2546 -0.0430 -0.0104 -0.3050 -0.0498 -0.0172
(0.0274) (0.2124) (0.2135) (0.0319) (0.2253) (0.2258)
-0.0067 -0.0079 -0.0082 -0.0094
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0082) (0.0082)
2.2367 3.6454 2.3337 4.1932
(0.4874) (0.9700) (0.5449) (1.0513)
1.0699 0.9718 1.1012 0.9967
(0.3474) (0.3444) (0.3773) (0.3699)
1.3739 1.5325 1.5099 1.6430
(0.5611) (0.5612) (0.6725) (0.6690)
Year Fixed Effects? YYY YYY
NNY NNY
No. of Obs. 2,774 2,580 2,578 2,680 2,501 2,499
Log Likelihood -2,567 -2,301 -2,302 -2,377 -2,135 -2,134
Parent R&D to Sales Ratio
"Average Non-Haven Tax Rate" faced by a firm's competitors as a measure of this variable for a particular firm.  All specifications include year 
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the parent level.
Share of Haven Affiliate Sales in the 
Big 7
Use Industry Non-Haven Tax 
Rate?
Table 4
Determinants of the Demand for Havens, by Haven Type
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 through 3 is the ratio of affiliates in Big 7 Havens to affiliates in all havens, by parent, in 1982, 1989, 
1994 and 1999.  The dependent variable in columns 4 through 6 is the ratio of affiliate sales in Big 7 Havens to sales from affiliates in all havens, 
by parent, in 1982, 1989, 1994 and 1999.  All specifications are Tobit specifications.  "Log of Non-Haven Sales" is the log value of sales by 
affiliates in non-havens for a parent.  "Log of Parent Sales" is the log value of worldwide sales for a parent.  "Average Non-Haven Tax Rate" is the 
weighted average country tax rates for a parent in non-havens where country tax rates are the median tax rate for affiliates in that country and year 
and the weights are affiliate sales.  "Industry Share of Sales to Related Parties Abroad" is the weighted average industry ratio of sales to related 
parties abroad to total sales where industry ratios are determined with data aggregated at the three-digit SIC level for all affiliates in that industry 
worldwide and weights are affiliate sales. "Parent R&D to Sales Ratio" is the ratio of parent R&D to sales.  Specifications 3, 6, and 9 use the 
Square of Log of Non-Haven Sales
Square of Log of Parent Sales
Average Non-Haven Tax Rate
Log of Parent Sales
Log of Non-Haven Sales
Share of Haven Affiliates in the Big 7
Industry Share of Sales to Related 
Parties AbroadDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.0037 0.0034 0.0133 0.0141 -0.0022 -0.0066
(0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0206) (0.0208) (0.0275) (0.0275)




Own Affiliate in Haven in Region -0.0207 -0.0225 -0.0227 -0.0244
(0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0070) (0.0072)
0.0073 0.0073
(0.0029) (0.0029)
0.0973 0.0974 0.0996 0.0985 0.0961 0.0949
(0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0422) (0.0422) (0.0432) (0.0432)
Leverage -0.0145 -0.0145 -0.0116 -0.0117 -0.0129 -0.0130
(0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0209) (0.0209)
-0.0401 -0.0401 -0.0461 -0.0437 -0.0414 -0.0388
(0.0569) (0.0569) (0.0543) (0.0542) (0.0555) (0.0554)
YYYYYY
NNNNYY
No. of Obs. 137,895 137,895 137,895 137,895 103,431 103,431
R-Squared 0.5936 0.5936 0.5989 0.5995 0.6007 0.6013
median tax rate faced by affiliates within a country in a given year.  "Leverage" is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets for the affiliate in that 
year.  "Leverage Interacted with Country Tax Rate" is the product of "Leverage" and "Country Tax Rate."  All specifications include parent, 
industry and year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the affiliate level.
Leverage Interacted with Country 
Tax Rate
Parent, Industry, and Year Fixed 
Effects?
Parent Owns Haven Affiliates 
Only in Dot Havens
Parent Owns Regional Haven 
Affiliates Only in Dot Havens
Country Tax Rate
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of foreign taxes paid to sales for affiliates in non-havens by year, from 1982 to 1999.  The sample in the 
specifications preseented in columns 5 and 6 is restricted to those parents with an affiliate in a haven.  The analysis uses analytic weights equal to 
sales to transform the specifications in a way that is equivalent to multiplying through by sales.  "Own Affiliate in Haven" is a dummy variable set 
equal to one if the parent of the affiliate owns an affiliate in a haven anywhere in the world in that year and is set equal to zero otherwise.  "Parent 
Owns Haven Affiliates Only in Dots" is a dummy variable set equal to one in a particular year if the affiliate's parent owns at least one affiliate in a 
dot haven but no affiliates in Big 7 havens; it is set equal to zero otherwise.  "Own Affiliate in Haven in Region" is a dummy variable set equal to 
one if the parent of the affiliate owns an affiliate in a haven in the same region as the affiliate in that year and is set equal to zero otherwise.   
"Parent Owns Regional Haven Affiliates Only in Dots" is a dummy variable set equal to one in a particular year if the affiliate's parent owns at least 
Restrict Sample to Affiliates of 
Parents with a Haven Affiliate?
Ratio of Foreign Taxes to Sales
Havens and Tax Payments of U.S. Multinational Affiliates
Table 5Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.3582 0.0070 0.2015 0.0034





1.2134 1.2318 1.4204 1.4502
(0.1643) (0.1712) (0.1839) (0.1890)
Period Fixed Effects? YY YY
No. of Obs. 6,873 6,873 6,785 6,785
R-Squared 0.0918 0.0135 0.0632 0.0113
Affiliate Net PPE Growth in 
Non-Havens
Table 6
First Stage Regressions: Non-Haven Activity and Local Economic Growth
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of sales (columns 1 and 2) and Net PPE (columns 3 and 4) for multinational 
parents in non-havens, by region, for the periods between benchmark survey years (1982-1989, 1989-1994, 1994-1999).  The 
five regions are Europe, Latin America and Other Western Hemisphere, Asia/Pacific, Africa, and the Middle East.  "Beginning 
of Period Sales in Non-Havens" is the value of sales in the first year of the period for parents in non-havens in the region.  
"Beginning of Period Net PPE in Non-Havens" is the value of Net PPE in the first year of the period for parents in non-havens 
in the region.  "GDP Growth Rate" is the weighted average growth rate of the non-haven economies where the weights are the 
share of parent Net PPE in a country within that region.  All specifications include period fixed effects.  
Beginning of Period Sales in Non-
Havens
GDP Growth Rate
Beginning of Period Net PPE in 
Non-Havens
Affiliate Sales Growth in Non-
Havens(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant 0.0173 -0.1358 -0.0154 -0.1011 0.8334 0.9550 -0.0303 -0.1157 -0.2526 -0.2910
(0.1388) (0.2336) (0.1434) (0.2200) (0.3607) (0.3628) (0.2285) (0.2515) (0.2248) (0.2318)
6.5934 8.4789 2.9064 7.9395 4.1771
(1.3346) (3.7516) (3.0858) (2.6879) (1.9855)
6.2493 7.2020 1.1997 7.5724 5.3181
(1.3145) (3.1900) (2.7748) (2.8271) (2.1901)
Period Fixed Effects? YYYY YY YY YY
IV with GDP Growth and 
Initial Levels? YNYN YY YY YY
IV with GDP Growth? NYNY NN NN NN
No. of Obs. 816 817 817 817 231 231 320 321 245 245
Log Likelihood -531 -543 -534 -543 -130 -130 -208 -210 -167 -167
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable set equal to one if the parent begins using havens during a period (1982-1989, 1989-1994, 1994-1999) within a region and set equal to zero if the 
parent stops using a haven during a period within a region.  The five regions employed in the regressions in columns 1 through 4 are Europe, Latin America and Other Western Hemisphere, 
Asia/Pacific, Africa, and the Middle East.  In columns 5 through 10, observations are not pooled across regions and results are presented separately for Asia/Pacific (columns 5 and 6), Europe (columns 
7 and 8) and Latin America and Other Western Hemisphere (columns 9 and 10).  "Affiliate Sales Growth in Non-Havens" is the predicted value of sales growth in non-havens from the first stage 
regressions presented in Table 6.  "Affiliate Net PPE Growth in Non-Havens" is the predicted value of Net PPE growth in non-havens from the first stage regressions presented in Table 6.  In columns 
1, 3, 5, 7 and 9, the predicted values are from first-stage regressions that employ both initial levels of either sales or Net PPE and GDP growth rates.  In columns 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10, the predicted values 
are from first-stage regressions that employ GDP growth rates.  All specifications include period fixed effects, and standard errors are corrected as indicated in Murphy and Topel (1985).
Affiliate Sales Growth in Non-
Havens
Affiliate Net PPE Growth in 
Non-Havens
Dependent Variable: Haven Use Dummy
Asia/Pacific Europe
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